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ARMS AND POLITICS IN COSTA RICA
AND NICARAGUA, 1948-1981

Introduction
From the time the Sandinistas seized the National Palace in August
1978 until the ir victory on July 19, 1979, the Nicaraguan Revolution has
brought worldwide attention to Central America tha t has y et to diminish.
The recent event s i n El Sa l vado r, exa c erb at e d by apparent interference
from the young and struggling Sandinista government, as well as a growing
awareness by the outside world of the internal agitation in Guatemala, have
maintained that attention.

Honduras regularly goes through its own

political convulsions, and not long ago, Panama was an issue of national
controversy in the United States during talks on the canal treatie s.

But

tiny Costa Rica--that "ideal democracy" in the midst of Central American
military chaos--has received little outside recognition o f the internal
problems and conflicts that signal departures from its admirable traditions.

Faced with an economic crisis unparalleled in its history,

shocked during the spring of 1981 by a series of terrorist attacks once
thought "impossible" in such a tranquil country, and still trying to
understand its leaders' involvement in the Nicaraguan Revolution, Costa
Rica demands our scrutiny.
The intent of this paper is to demonstrate Costa Rica's involvement in the Nicaraguan Revolution as the culmination of an historical
process set into motion some thirty years before.

The nature of that
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Introduction
From the time the Sandinistas seized the National Palace in August
1978 until their victory on July 19, 1979, the Nicaraguan Revolution has
brought worldwide attention to Central America that has yet to diminish.
The recent events i n El Sa l vador , exacerbated b y a p parent interference
from the y oung and struggling Sandinista government, as well as a growing
awarene ss b y the outside world of the internal agitation in Guatemala, have
maintained that attention.

Honduras regularly goes through its own

politic al convulsions, and not long ago, Panama was an issue of national
controversy in the United States during talks on the canal treaties.

But

tiny Costa Rica--that "ideal democracy" in the midst of Central American
military chaos--has received little outside recognition of the internal
problems and conflicts that signal departures from its admirable tradi tions.

Faced with an economic crisis unparalleled in its history,

shocked during the spring of 1981 by a series of terrorist attacks once
thought "impossible" in such a tranquil country , and still try ing to
understand its l e aders' involvement in the Nicaraguan Revolution, Costa
Rica demands our scrutiny.
The intent of this paper is to demonstrate Costa Rica's involvement in the Nicaraguan Revolution as the culmination of an historical
process set into motion some thirty years before.

The nature of that

2

involvement--as a conduit for arms to several o f the world's "hot spots"-a l so n eeds t o be examined and discussed .

In addi tion, this study will

cover events surrounding the transfer of armaments through Costa Rica
before, during, and after the Nicaraguan Revolution.

It will also docu-

ment the results of Costa Rica's Legislative Assembly Special Commission
that investigated the movement of arms.
All these issues are important in understanding the changes going
on inside Co sta Rica today.

Such an examination also helps to explain

the daily turmoil in Central America.

Finally , such a study provides an

indication of what may lie a head for both Costa Rica and the Central
Ame ri can region as a whole.

Costa Rica and Nicaragua:
Conflict and Contrast
To understand Costa Rica's role in the Nicaraguan Revolution, both
its historical process in relation to Nicaragua and its internal workings
as a nation need to be examined briefly.

In many respects, Costa Rica and

Nicaragua could not have differed more during the forty years prior to the
Nicaraguan conflict.

Although both have been t y pical examples of Latin

American countries that export primary goods (cotton, coffee, and bananas)
in exchange for industrial pro ducts, their respective social and political
structures have contrasted remarkably .
Nicaragua is a nation characterized by natural geographic b a rriers,
dispersed population, and social and ethnic stratification.

1

Over the

years, social cleavages developed and internal differences e rupted into
rebellions or spurred the growth of guerrilla movements, inhibiting
attempts to create a more stable, democratic governing process.

Anastasio

Somoza Garcia's seizure of powe r in 1936 militarize d the Na tional Guard,

3

which eventually repressed the Nicaraguan people as brutally as any Latin
Americ an regime to the present day.

2

The Sandinistas' rise to prominence

in the 1970s was a response to the increasing viciousness of the Somoza
regime.
Costa Rica's history, on the other hand, shows a different social
and political development.

Over the centuries, the majority of its popu-

lation settled on the Meseta Central (central plate a.u), inland from the two
oceans.

This settlement, however, did not begin until the 1800s, with the

arrival of small landowning farmers, unaccompanied by enslaved blacks or
Indians.

As a result, social differences tended to be inconspicuous,3

which allowed a less tumultuous and more positive political evolution.

4

Since the 1930s, Costa Rica's democratic procedure has been noticeably
abused only once.

The resulting successful revolution in 1948, led by the

flamboyant Jose (Don Pepe) Figueres, actually served to strengthen and
broaden the democratic process.

5

In addition, the new constitution

replaced the military with a civilian police force.

6

In contrast to the

vigorous censorship under Somoza, Costa Rican press and radio traditionally
have been free to attack whichever political party is in office.
Furthermore, Costa Rica has taken pride in a more egalitarian
socio-economic development,
literacy.

7

including a strong emphasis on education and

For instance, the Costa Rican constitution requires compulsory

attendance in primary school and state support for education, in contrast
with the Nicaraguan constitution, which never clearly states whether education is mandatory or state-supported.

8

Border disturbances, disputes over waterway rights, and squabbles
concerning tuna fishing areas have been common between Costa Rica and
Nicaragua throughout their existence as neighbors.

9

Such problems have

4
been relatively minor, however; and even with the social, economic, and
political differences noted above, they are not sufficient to explain Costa
Rica's deep involvement in the Nicaraguan Revolution of 1978-79.

To com-

plete the picture, one needs to go back to the 1940s and the aspirations
of the Costa Rican leader Jos~ Figueres.

Born in 1906, Figueres acquired his education in both Costa Rica
and the United States.

In 1928, he settled down on his farm, La Lucha, to

cultivate cabuya (sisal used in making rope).

His continued reading of

political a nd philo sophic a l works, late r coupled with a growing dissatis~

faction with the presidency of Rafael Angel Calderon, led Figueres increasingly to express his political views in public.

In July 1942, government

officials interrupted Figueres midwa y through an impassioned radio address
attacking the Calderon administration and its policies.

He was arrested,

taken to jail, and quickly exiled on questionable grounds.

His two years

of exile, spent mostly _in Mexico, served to increase Don Pepe's prestige in
Costa Rica and allowed him to develop his political ideology.

It also gave

him time to pursue plans to oust the Calderonistas, whom he regarded as a
threat to Costa Rican democracy.

In Mexico, Figueres made contacts with

political exiles of other Central American countries, which led him to
recognize the need for a joint effort to remove all Central American dictators, including Calderon.

Studying armaments and warfare strategies, he

prepared himself for this endeavor.

10

In 1944, Don Pepe returned to a popular reception in Costa Rica,
where Calderon's choice, Teodoro Picado, was now President.

From his farm

at La Lucha, Figueres dabbled in the politics of various opposition parties, but also kept his hand (and some money) in conspiratorial matters.

5

Thi s involvement led him to sign an agreement, the Caribbean Pact, in 1947
with Central American revolutionaries.

In the accord, he promised to work

with all group attempts against dictatorial regimes in Central America.

A

year later this group became known as the Caribbean Legion, and its actions
stimulated Central American and Caribbean guerrilla movements throughout
the next decade.

11

In February 1948, election irregularities provoked a civil war in
Costa Rica, and Figueres assumed a leading role in the ensuing rebellion.
with the aid of the newly-formed Caribbean Legion, he and his companions
won the brief forty-day revo l ut ion.

With Don Pepe at its head, a pro-

visional junta ruled for the next eighteen months and drafted a constitution that restored the original democratic system.

12

The 1948 Revolution, however, produced a new element in Costa Rican
politics--an increasing antagonism between Jos~ Figueres and the Somoza
family of Nicaragua--that plagued the two nations for the next thirty
years.

The Somoza regime had been founded by the intelligent and ambitious

Anastasio Somoza Garc{a.
ans and meddling

u.s.

the National Guard.

In 1932, by conniving with influential Nicaragu-

officials, Somoza managed to be appointed chief of
Bolstered by the guard's strength and efficiency, he

took control of the Nicaraguan political scene in 1936.

In the 1940s, he

became a prime target for social-democratic guerrilla groups, especially
.
.
13
t h e Carlbbean Leglon.
Subsequently, members of the Nicaraguan National Guard were accused
of fighting alongside the Calderonista forces during Costa Rica's 1948 Revolution.

Later that year, Somoza responded to Caribbean Legion activities

coordinated in Costa Rica
Costa Rica.

by aiding a Calderon invasion into northwestern

This action prompted Figueres to appeal to the Organization of

6

American States.

Delegates from the OAS arrived several days later to

examine the situation.

Their study resulted in an OAS reprimand of both

countries and the placement of OAS surveillance teams at the NicaraguaCosta Rica border.
two months.

Tensions cooled, and the surveillance teams left after

14

Relations between the two nations remained calm until early 1954,
when Costa Rican authorities discovered weapons in two areas of the country.

Several men were detained, at least one of whom had fought with Don

Pepe and the Caribbean Legion during the 1948 Rebellion.

The following

day, however, the Legislative Assembly defeated a proposed bill to expel
arms traffickers from Costa Rica.

Less than three months later, Nicaraguan

authorities arrested twenty-two persons involved in a plot to assassinate
Anastasio Somoza.
members.

Among those captured were several Caribbean Pact

Somoza charged, correctly, that Figueres had supported the

attempt, and relations between the two countries deteriorated further.

15

On January 11, 1955, another Somoza-backed Calderonista invasion
of Costa Rica took place.

Days later their planes strafed several Costa

Rican cities, causing Figueres, now President of Costa Rica, to appeal
again to the
b rough t t h e

~AS.

.

Within hours, four U.S. fighter jets intervened and
.

s~tuat~on

un d er control. 16

A year and a half later, the Nicaraguan rule altered significantly
when a young poet assassinated dictator Somoza Garc{a.

His two sons imme-

diately inherited the regime with Lu{s becoming President and Anastasio,
Jr., the head of the National Guard.

Under Lu{s, freedom of the press

increased and a more moderate political atmosphere prevailed.
the antipathy between Nicaragua and Costa Rica continued.

However,

In May 1957,

7

Costa Rican authorities uncovered a plot to assassinate President Figueres.
They a rre sted three Cubans, who implicated Dominican Republic dictator
. . 1 10, as we 11 as LU1S
'
.
Ra f ae 1 TruJl
an d AnastaslO
Somoza. 1

7

Meanwhile, the illicit Central American weapons trade continued.
In mid-September 1957, Honduran officials accused former Costa Rican war

. ,

.

veteran Frank Marshall Jlmenez of transportlng arms through Honduras.

The

accusations led to an investigation by Costa Rica's Legislative Assembly
during which Marshall implicated many influential people in the National
·
) 18 t h e natlon
.
, s most promlnent
.
. .
Ll. b
eratlon
Party (
PLN,
polltlcal
group.

But

despite the lengt h o f the scandal and a s sertions by the investigating committee that a "sensational" report was forthcoming, no report was ever
released .

19

At this time, Fidel Castro and his men were mak ing headlines with
their guerrilla forays out of the Sierra Maestra mountains in eastern
Cuba.

Not surprisingly, many Costa Ricans supported Castro's efforts to

overthrow Cuba's dictator, Fulgencio Batista.

Don Pepe himself worked

with Castro through an intermediary in Mexico,20 and the Caribbean Legion
continued to be a factor in the region's unrest.
As the turbulent fifties came to a close, the antagonisms between
Nicaragua and Costa Rica flared up again.

In mid-1959, 110 rebels (for-

merly based at Punta Llorona on the Pacific side of Costa Rica) supported
by Don Pepe invaded Nicaragua.

Because of bad timing, hurried planning,

and various mishaps, however, the attack failed within two weeks.

Among

the Costa Ricans implicated in the invasion were several PLN members, Frank
Marshall, and Figueres .

In 1960

yet another revolutionary force launched

an abortive effort to oust Somoza from Costa Rican territory.

But this

time the Costa Rican Civil Guard acted as effectively as the Nicaraguan

8
National Guard in ending the attempt, a clear change in government policy
toward s u c h matters.

Costa Rica's days as a staging area for exporting

revolutions seemed to be over.

21

The next half dozen years were quieter for Central America.
in April 1967, LuIs Somoza died unexpectedly.

Then,

This allowed his West Point-

educated brother, Anastasio, to assume full control of Nicaragua.

His

leadership brought a more rightist and militant perspective to the government.

22
The early 1970s, with Jos~ Figueres once again Costa Rica's Presi-

dent, were a time o f ambiva lent rel a tions between the Nicaraguan and Costa
Rican governments .

The 1972 earthquake in Nicaragua's capital, Managua,

bro ught considerable aid from its southern neighbor.

Such assistance was

unfortunately marred by the corrupt behavior of Nicaraguan authorities.

In

spite of the tense relations, however, Figueres and Somoza did meet on
several occasions to discuss Central American affairs, including the clar'
,
1' f lcatlon
0 f

'
' 1 b oun d arles.
'
23
terrltorla

Then in October 1977, border clashes between the growing Sandinista
guerrilla force and the Nicaraguan National Guard resulted in Costa Rica's
closing its northern border .

Three days later, Costa Rica's El Excelsior

reported that the Nicaraguan National Guard was occupying a three-k ilometer
strip inside the Costa Rican border.

The following month,Somoza accused

Costa Rica of neglecting to patrol its border and thereby allowing guerrilla activity in Costa Rican territory.24
On January 10, 1978, prominent Nicaraguan editor and opposition
political spokesman Pedro JuaquIn Chamorro was assassinated.

Suspecting

government involvement, in the killing, the Sandinista National Liberation
Front (FSLN) and other opposition groups redoubled their efforts to rid

9

Nicaragua of Somoza.
nation.

In late January, a general strike crippled the

In February, fighting broke out between the National Guard and

"civilian bands" in Masaya.

Assassinations of several prominent figures at

both ends of the political spectrum took place in the ensuing months, and
the murder of five students in Jinotepe on July 9 set off riots throughout
the country.

25

Then, on August 22, a group of two dozen young Sandinistas led by
Eden Pastora (Comandante Cero) electrified the world with a dramatic
seizure of Nicaragua's National Palace.

For two days, they held more than

five hundred government employees hostage, including the entire Congress.
During the siege, they forced Somoza to release fifty-eight political
prisoners, obtained five hundred thousand dollars, and received safe conduct out of Nicaragua to Panama.

What made this event especially interest-

ing, particularly for Costa Ricans, was the subsequent revelation that many
~

of the guns Pastora used in that daring exploit were provided by Jose
Figueres, from his 1948 arsenal on La Lucha.

The aging former President

was still nurturing some of the revolutionary schemes of his younger
days.

26

Costa Rica and the Nicaraguan Revolution
By the early 1970s, Eden Pastora's guerrilla activities in
Nicaragua had forced him to flee to Costa Rica, where he lived with his
family and operated a power plant in the Atlantic port of Barra del
Colorado.

But the events of 1978 brought the Panamanian-born Pastora back

into action.

After making contact with Figueres, Pastora and his youthful

band cleaned out what was left of Don Pepe's cache of 1948 weapons and
.

headed for Nlcaragua.

27-

10
Figueres acted on his own as one revolutionary helping another.
His actions , however, were not known to the public until May of 1981.

At

that time , Pastora and Figueres each spoke about the latter's assistance.
Although their accounts differed,28 Don Pepe's complicity was clear; when
Pastora approached him for guns in mid-1978, he decide d that the FSLN was
capable of overthrowing his long-time adversary and was therefor e deserving
of his support.

29

Following the successful seizure of the National Palace, the fighting intensified in Nicaragua.

On September 7, 1978, the FSLN coordinate d

attacks on almost every maj or city i n Nicaragua, and on September 13,
Somoza declare d martial law.

On September 1 2 , howeve r, a muc h more serious

event had o c curred for Costa Ricans when Nicaraguan Air Force planes
strafed La Cruz, a town inside the border of Costa Rica, wounding several
students and teachers.

This incident was to be the first of numerous

Nicaraguan Air Force and National Guard incursions during the next t e n
months.

The following day, Panama and Venezuela sent several warplane s and

helicopters to Costa Rica.

Two days later, Costa Rica signed a mutual-

.
. h Vene zue 1 a. 30
asslstance
agreement Wlt

Soon after, Somoza charged that the Sandinistas were using Costa
Rican territory as a "neutral rear guard."

He continued throughout the war

to insist that the FSLN took advantage of Costa Rican inability to control
its border are a.

Eventually he claimed that Costa Rica willingly protected

the FSLN guerrillas.

Newspapers in San Jose answered with private adver-

tisements in support of the Sandinistas.

Newspapers and radio broadcasts

also carried periodic denunciations of Somoza, his regime, and the atrocities committed by his

a~y.

31

11

In addition, the September 12 air attack prompted a protest from
Costa Rica to the OAS, and two weeks later, Costa Rica's President Rodrigo
Carazo Odio condemned Somoza before the United Nations.

Howeve r, the slow

response of the OAS, as well as its assertions that Costa Rica could not
control its borders, drew heated warnings from both Carazo and Public
Security Minister Juan Jose Echevarria Brealey that they were considering
withdrawal from an "ineffective" OAS.

Carazo further pointed out tha t such

c ountries as the United States, and a few in Asia, could not completely
control their borders.

Nonetheless, he and Minister Echevarria insisted

that efforts were bein g made t o c ontrol their northern borders and that
many Sandinistas had already been arrested and deported to Panama.

They

both denied any support of the FSLN, citing border clean-up operations by
the Costa Rican Civil Guard.

Such clean-up efforts occurred frequently

throughout the war" .. which might explain their basic ineffectiveness. 32
President Carazo and Minister Echevarria were to be the principal
policy-framers for the Costa Rican government during and after the
Nicaraguan Revolution .

Both had broken with Figueres and the PLN during

the 1970 election campaign, and later created their own political party
called the Popular Unity Party (PUP).

In 1974 Carazo lost his initial

presidential bid, but in 1978, he defeated PLN candidate LUlS Alberto
Monge Alvarez.

He then named Jose Echevarria, his campaign manager, to the

dual position of Minister of Public Security and Minister of the Interior .
A former U. S. military academy student in his mid-thirties, Echevarria
'
.
. h t- h an d man d
urlng
t h e Nlcaraguan
con fl'lct. 33
b ecame Carazo , s rlg
October brought a reduction in border tensions, but no cease-fire
within Nicaragua.

Official government statements and radio broadcasts from

both Costa Rica and Nicaragua continued to exchange charges and

12
counter-charges.
boat~but

Minister Echevarr{a reportedly purchased some

denied buying any weapons for the country.

u.s.

patrol

In addition, after

assuring Nicaraguans and Costa Ricans alike that no Sandinista guerrilla
camps existed inside the country's border area, he requested th at Eden
Pastora leave Costa Rica.

34

Events in November, however, became more serious when border violations increased, and on November 15, two Nicaraguan helicopters landed
near Los Chiles in northern Costa Rica.

Security Minister Echevarr{a con-

sequently discussed the possibility of buying arms from Israel, and the
next day, he announced that Costa Rican officials would consider purchasing
two

u.s.

helicopters.

In conjunction with the latter plan, the Security

Department acknowledged that a group of officials had already been sent to
Panama for training in helicopter operation and maintenance.

35

Then on November 21, 1978, Nicaraguan National Guardsmen fired upon
several Costa Rican Civil Guards on border patrol, killing two and taking
the third prisoner.

Costa Ricans erupted in outrage.

The Costa Rican

government immediately broke diplomatic relations with Nicaragua, and a
week later, volunteer military training began across the nation.

The media

stepped up their denunciations of Somoza, and President Carazo's prote sts
to the OAS brought officials to investigate four days later.

36

As December began, Somoza took steps to alleviate the worsening
situation in Nicaragua.

On December 7, he agreed to end martial law and

offered complete amnesty to the guerrillas.
fifty-seven political prisoners.

Five days later, he released

But such belated measures were to no

avail; the growing opposition ignored his overtures of peace and hardened
.
..
37
ltS posltlon.

13

.- Loria of Costa Rica's Prensa
Meanwhile, reporter Jose" Juaquln
Libre c aused a sensation by publishing a rumor that five thousand mercenaries--primarily Venezuelans and Panamanians--were entering Nicaragua near
Penas Blancas in northwestern Costa Rica.

In the early hours of the next

morning, President Carazo had Loria "drafted" into the public police force
and placed in the hands of two Civil Guardsmen .

Carazo and a group of

officials and reporters then accompanied Loria to the border so that he
c ould indicate where guerrilla camps supposedly were located .

No camps

could be found, but Carazo's intimidation of Loria incurred severe editorial criticism from the newspaper s .
· hh an d e d ness "mlng
. 1 e d Wlt
. h c h arges
"h 19

38
0

Cries of "over-reaction" and
f constltutlona
..
1

. 1
· o ns
V10
atl

.3

9

While fighting continued in Nicaragua, and intermittent National
Guard and Air Force violations were reported on Costa Rica's northern
border, the OAS finished its investigation concerning the November 21
border attack.

The OAS representatives visited both sides of the border,

but their findings were anything but pleasing to Costa Rica because the
OAS declared that neither side had been at fault.

40

This ruling may have encouraged the events that soon followed .

On

December 23, General Gonzalo Evertz, the head of National Guard troops in
southern Nicaragua, claimed in a telephone interview with Costa Rica's
Radio Reloj that Costa Rican complicity with FSLN forc e s was continuing.
Then, even as the Costa Rican government was requesting a permanent OAS
observer to monitor the disputed border, Nicaragua's Foreign Minister
alleged that high-caliber fire was coming from Costa Rican territory.
Shortly after, Evertz declared that Guanacaste province (lost to Costa Rica
more than 150 years before) would soon be recaptured.

This pronouncement

14
was followed by continued Nicaraguan claims of high-caliber cross-border
fire and finally by Somoza's threatening to invade Costa Rica.
The situation between the two nations verged on war.

41
Two years

later, former Security Minister Echevarria revealed that the circumstances
were much worse at that time than the Costa Rican public realized.

Testi-

fying before a Special Legislative Commission (previously formed to
investigate arms trafficking), Echevarr i a claimed that the Costa Rican
government had received five different warnings.

He implied that only the

efforts of the u.S. ambassador to Costa Rica, Marvin Weissman, had forestalled a Nicaraguan invasion.

Presumably, Weissman had called officials

in Managua after Echevarrla told him Venezuelan jets were ready to bomb
Managua if Somoza ordered an attack on Costa Rica.

Weissman reported to

Echevarria that the invasion was called off "only forty minutes before"
it was to have been launched.

42

Carazo had also cabled the OAS, and two days later, an OAS representative promised to send seven observers and four assistants.
was not the only response from the Costa Rican government.

But that

Echevarria

later confirmed that a decisive change took place in the government's
policy toward Nicaragua .

He and Carazo viewed Somoza's threat as a

"declaration of war" and acted accordingly.

Echevarrla ordered the Civil

Guard to place mines underneath bridges and dynamite charges on mountain
sides in order to secure the province of Guanacaste.

43

Meanwhile, Somoza retreated from his original threat, although he
still insisted that mortar fire was coming from across the border and
that Costa Rica was aiding the Sandinistas.

Subsequent OAS investigations

did not prove such claims, but then, OAS officials had limited resources
and were foreigners to Costa Rica and Nicaragua.

It is also possible that

15
such officials may have favored the FSLN and other anti-Somoza forces
because b y this time1 most Western Hemisphere countries were appalled b y
Somoza's conduct.

44

The following weeks were quieter, as the OAS officials installed
themselves in Liberia, Costa Rica, and Rivas, Nicaragua.

But on January

23, 1979, a Costa Rican girl was fatally shot near La Cruz in northern
Guanacaste by a Nicaraguan soldier and died two days later.

Residents of

border towns in Guanacaste sought refuge in schools farther south during
the next several days , and Civil Guardsmen red o ubled their vigilance along
the border.

President Carazo filed another protest with the OAS.

45

Me anwhile, the President was coming under inc reasing criticism from
the opposition PLN party.

Their leader, ex-President Daniel Oduber,

called Carazo "the ruler of the great lie."

Other members of the PLN

accused Carazo and his administration of pursuing a "Nixon-sty le" p olicy
of "endangering the nation's social peace, weakening the legislative
branch, and playing with the country's patriotic feelings."

They also

blamed Carazo for the problems of the Central American Common Market
(CACM).46

These initial complaints and criticisms were to multiply after

the Nicaraguan war ended.
Relations between Nicaragua and Costa Rica did not improve during
February.

Nicaraguan claims of mortar fire and Costa Rican complaints of

overflights persisted.

In response to a reporter's question concerning

the existence of a "Venezuela-Panama-Costa Rica axis" against Somoza,
President Carazo answered only that Costa Rica desired "to live in p eace,"
and yet the government had sent twenty -five Civil Guardsmen to Venezuela
for military training.

Two weeks later, Security Minister Echevarr l a
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announced plans for a large mop-up campaign along the border.

Termed

"Operation Checkmate," its mission was to sweep the northern border's
entire four hundred kilometers, using seven hundred men to "eliminate as
necessary" either Nicaraguan National Guardsmen or Sandinista guerrillas.
A week later, two Nicaraguan civilians were reportedly shot, one fatall y ,
within Costa Rican territory by twelve National Guardsmen.

The OAS itself

confirmed the report, and within days, "Operation Checkmate" was
underway .
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On March 2, Echevarr{a confirmed reports that the Venezuelan
government had recently loaned Costa Rica a supply of M-14 rifles and sufficient ammunition "for an indefinite period."

He gave no estimates of

the amounts involved, but indicated they were to aid in resolving border
problems.

Eleven days later, the PLN claimed such an arms loan was

illegal because it had not been approved by the Legislative ASSemb1y.48
Concern was also expressed over the potential militarization of Costa Rica.
That same day , La Rep~lica published a document attributed to the Interior
Ministry that claimed that the purpose of "Operation Checkmate" was to
"disorganize and ridicule guerrilla leaders."

Clearly annoyed, Echevarria

asserted that the document was only a draft that subsequently had been
altered.

He also reaffirmed that the mop-up campaign was intended to pro-

tect Costa Rica's sovereignty by "taking away the excuse" for the
Nicaraguan National Guard to make "incursions into our territory " in pursuit of Sandinistas and other 1eftists.
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The fact that La Reptiblica, a

mainstream newspaper, published such a document and questioned the border
clean-up operation implied support for the FSLN's cause.
growing popular support in Costa Rica for the guerrillas.

It also reflected
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In mid-March, the Nicaraguan government claimed capture of weapons
allegedly brought in from Costa Rica .

They included Soviet-made rockets,

German machine guns, rifles, explosives, and Brazilian-made detonators.
The Nicaraguan government further contended that additional arms had
arrived the week before, also from Costa Rica.

The international media

now began to hint at the use of Costa Rican territory b y guerrilla forces,
probably in response to Nicaraguan charges.
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"Operation Checkmate" halted at the end of March, partly because
of the controversy it had raised and partly because of government assertions that border conditions had returned to normal.

Questioned about the

country's arms situation, Minister EchevarrIa assured u.S. Representative
Eldon Rudd of Arizona that although Venezuela had loaned his country five
hundred rifles, none of them were falling into Sandinista hands.

They were

intended only to fill a shorta ge that Echevarr{a claimed he found upon
entering government service in 1978.

Rudd also expressed concern that such

a transfer of rifles made in the United States constituted a violation of
the prohibition against re-exportation of arms.

This p articular issue was

never pursued, but as late as May 1981, the Costa Rican government still
had not returned the "loaned" rifles.
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As the Nicaraguan war raged, the Costa Rican government's arms
situation took a different turn several weeks later.

On April 18, a

government official reported that some four thousand government weapons-primarily M-76 submachine guns and M-1 rifles--were missing.

It was also

reported that the Public Security Ministry "customarily" had loaned weapons
to prominent private citizens for their personal protection, weapons which
"dm
"
"52
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Fourteen months later, national concern would again focus on the issue of
adequate c ontrol over government weaponry.
Relations between the Costa Rican and Nicaraguan governments
remained strained throughout April and into May of 1979.

On May 1,

President Carazo reiterated his refusal to resume diplomatic relations with
Nicaragua so long as Somoza was in power.

Ten days later, the Nicaraguan

government denounced Panama for allegedly supplying arms to the Sandinistas.

It also claimed that "international brigades" were openly

..
. h t h e support
organlzlng
t h ere Wlt

0

f th
'
e Panamanlan
government. 53

At the end o f May, Somoza bro ught cha rges before the OAS that
Panama, Venezuela, and Costa Rica were supplying weapons to the guerrilla
f o rces in Nicaragua.

Two days later, he charged that a "massive invasion"

had penetrated his country from two points inside Costa Rica's borders.
(The invasion proved to consist of only three hundred mercenaries.)

Somoza

later was proved to be correct on both counts, but by this time, his
country was in chaos.

In addition, the OAS had come within three votes of

condemning him for human rights violations, and he and his gove r nment had
been denounced world-wide.

Under these circumstances, complaints about an

invasion were likely to fallon unsympathetic ears.

However, a week later

the OAS did announce its inte ntion to investigate the situation, but e vidently only because Somoza had threatened to invade Costa Rica in retaliation for its support of the rebels.
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While the Costa Rican government continued to deny any complicity
with Nicaraguan rebels, an editorial in La Naci6 n denounced the country's
involvement on the side of the FSLN.

But the government's policies seemed

to bear out its claim of noninterference:

in the border area it mobilized

more Civil Guardsmen, who continued to arrest Sandinistas.

On June 6,

19
President Carazo went so far as to declare the border region a war zone .
Nine d ays l ater he warned Somoza not to invade Costa Rica, vowing that
"the whole continent would respond."

By this time, however, Somoza was too

O d to carry out any prevlous
.
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Then on June 18, the FSLN's recently formed Government for the
National Reconstruction met in San Jost , Costa Rica.

While international

news agencies now regularly reported Costa Rican aid to the FSLN, events
in Nicaragua forced Somoza's ouster within a month.

On July 1, del e gate s

from the Panamanian government met with the FSLN p rovisional junta.

Eleven

days later, as the FSLN f o rce s clo s e d i n on Managua, the Nicaraguan provisional junta met in Puntarenas on the Pacific coast of Costa Rica with
Carazo , P a nama's Torrijos, and Venezuela's former President Carlos Andres
Pe rez.

Soon after, on July 17, Anastasio Somoza resigned and fled to the

United States, and two days later, the fighting in Nicaragua ceased,
parades celebrated the occasion, and the junta began rebuilding its
devastated country.
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In the weeks following the collapse of the Somoza regime, a groundswell of moral support flowed from Costa Rica to its war-torn neighbor.
Only days before Somoza's fall, a public opinion poll in Costa Ric a h a d
confirme d popular approval of President Carazo's l eader s hip during the
Nicaraguan crisis.

On July 21, Carazo revealed in an interview some of the

plans to aid in Nicaraguan reconstruction, including help with the
resettlement of nearly sixty thousand refugees, technical assistance, and
formation of a group to study the revitalization of trade between Costa
Rica and Nicaragua.

The Carazo administration al s o a nnounced plans for

the creation of over one hundred "sister-city" arrangements to support
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Nicaragua's reconstruction.

Materials such as clothing, food, building

and medical supplies, as well as professional assistance, were to be sent.
Costa Rica's ambassador to Nicaragua announced plans to lead a team of
experts and technicians in the fields of agriculture, public health, and
.
.
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Additional proposals of aid included the promise of fifteen-day
boxes of food to families, and a government pledge to send one thousand
retired teachers to aid Nicaragua's literacy program.

This latter promise

was apparently made "to counteract an alleged increasing Cuban influence
in Nicaragua. ,,58

The Costa Rican government also sent some of its immigra-

tion officials to train Nicaraguan personnel at Sandino Airport in Managua
and at the border check points.

During a visit to Nicaragua on August 8,

President Carazo pledged assistance in the establishment of a twenty-five
million dollar compensation fund as well as continued support for the new
Nicaraguan government.

He also took this opportunity to insist that Costa

Rica had offered only "moral support, not material aid," during the
·
Nlcaraguan
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But most of these well-intentioned plans were greatly scaled down
or never even begun.

Bureaucratic delays, a lack of funds, and a growing

popular disenchantment with the FSLN government's Marxist ideology all combined to slow down the various assistance plans.
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For example, the

"sister-city" idea never went past the planning stage, although some Costa
Rican cities did initiate help on their own.

Only forty-six teachers

eventually went to Nicaragua, months later than originally promised, and
for a shorter time.

The teaching project, sparked by naturalized Costa

Rican Dr. Peter Duisberg, led to his formation of the Pro-Brotherhood
Tico-Nica International Committee comprised of native and recently
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naturalized Costa Rican citizens (primarily from the United States).

The

Committee 's two main purposes were to pressure the Costa Rican gove rnment
into fulfilling its various promises of aid to Nicaragua, and to counteract
the increasingly bad press that the media was giving Nicaragua.
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In December , several Nicaraguan junta members came to Costa Rica
to talk with government officials.
expressed their interest in exchange

In their meeting, the Nicaraguans
of petroleum by-products, cooperative

efforts for inhibiting coffee rust, avoidance of border area incidents, and
assistance in training Sandinista polic e and immigration personnel.

They

probably also discus s e d the refuge e p robl e m b e cause at this time, the
Immigration Department announced that twelve thousand Nicaraguan refugees
"
,62
were Stl' 11 1'lVlng
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Although Costa Rica's aid did not equal that originally proposed,
a modest level of assistance continued and Nicaraguan leaders met periodically with Costa Rican officials in 1980 to discuss cooperative economic
ventures and the resolution of border problems.

In November

Nicaragua's

foreign minister traveled to Costa Rica specifically to discuss the
increase in border incidents, but the two governments were totally unabl e
to resolve the matter.
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One apparent reflection of the increasingly ambivalent feelings
between the two nations (in spite of Costa Rican aid) was Nicaragua's decision not to invite President Carazo to its first anniversary celebration of
the Revolution.

No public speculation occurred as to the reason for such

an omission, but Carazo maintained he was too busy anyway .

Ten days later,

however, in a reference to Fidel Castro, he remarke d that he had no desire
to "be on a grandstand with any dictator. ,,64

Perhaps it was an astute
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exclusion in that Castro and Cuba rapidly were becoming more closely identified with the Nicaraguan reconstruction process than was Costa Rica.

Costa Rica and the Arms Probe
Elsewhere, events soon transpired that would call into question the
credibility of the Carazo administration and noticeably alter the political
situation in Costa Rica.

The very day that Carazo made his comment about

Castro, a Panamanian pilot named C~sar Rodr{guez crashed on a rural landing
strip approximately eighty miles east of San Salvador.

He was carrying

arms and ammunition evidently intended for the leftist guerrillas in EI
Salvador.
Costa Rica.
to Panama.

In addition, his flight plan included a stop for loading in
Later rescued by a private Costa Rican airplane, he was flown
Questioned there by local authorities, he claimed that retired

Costa Rican pilot Manuel Enrique Guerra was in charge of arms commerce to
EI Salvador from Costa Rica.

Guerra, now owner of a cargo and passenger

aircraft company, immediately denied the allegations, although he readily
acknowledged his part in helping the Sandinistas the year before.
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Even as Costa Rica's Radio Reloj carried official denials of Costa
Rican involvement in arms smuggling, a Panamanian news service reported
that President Carazo had ordered an investigation following the discovery
of a van loaded with modern arms and explosives inside the city of San
Jos~.

According to national and international media, which had been specu-

lating for several months about arms trafficking from Costa Rica to El
Salvador, such an investigation was long overdue.

In fact, Jos~ Figueres

himself initially raised the issue less than two months after the end of
the Nicaraguan Revolution.

Speaking to a group of Costa Rican businessmen

about Nicaragua's future, Don Pepe stated that he had helped unload Cuban
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arms from a plane at Llano Grande Airport (located outside Liberia,
Guanac aste,in northwestern Costa Rica) during a tour of guerrilla camps in
the Costa Rica-Nicaragua border area.

Although La Rep~lica pointed out

that this was Figueres' third assertion of the existence of a Cuban-weapons
.
. .
.
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An official investigation did not begin until the Rodriguez plane
crash in El Salvador and the simultaneous capture of what were later found
to be smuggled, Chinese-made mortar shells apparently stolen from Costa
Rica's national arsenal.

Led by three legislators and a professional
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Special Commission began its work late in June 1980.
not appear until eleven months later.

Its first report did

Although the c ommission originally

intended to complete its findings much sooner than May 1981, a succession
of new allegations, revelations, and incidents occurred, requiring further
study and the reinterrogation of previous witnesses.

68

The first stage of the commission's probe lasted until early
January 1981.

The country's Judicial Investigation Organization (OIJ)

brought four men to trial before Costa Rica's Attorney General on charges
of smuggling the Chinese seventy-five-millimeter mortar shells.
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Ten

months later, however, the OIJ still had been unable to gather enough evidence, which resulted in nullification of the case.

The smuggling incident

nevertheless spurred a government inventory of government weaponry following suggestions that the Chinese mortar shells might have been some that
were found along the northern border area by Costa Rican Civil Guardsmen.
Officials maintained that the shells certainly were not munitions used by
the armed forces in Costa Rica, but more likely were left over from the
nation's belatedly acknowledged defense efforts during the Nicaraguan
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Revolution .

The Public Security Minister's plans for destroying such left-

over munitions were halted by President Carazo at the urgings of the ViceMinister of Public Security and a commission investigator who wanted the
mortar shells and other munitions studied by the commission. 70
Meanwhile, the Rodr{guez plane crash set off an intriguing and
politically damaging investigation.

Although the incident proved that

Costa Rican territory could indeed be used for arms shuttling to El
Salvador, Costa Rican officials were quick to point out that this event
was not proof of a widespread arms network operating inside the country.
Salvadoran a u thorities r e f r a i ned from a ccus i n g the Costa Rican and
Panamanian governments of taking any part in the Rodriguez affair; they
. 1 y urge db ot h governments to carry out t h elr
" respectlve lnqulrles.
.. .
71
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That the governments of both El Salvador and Costa Rica had difficulty controlling such arms movements into El Salvador is not surprising.
In the area where Rodrlguez landed, for instance, 150 airstrips exist; and
more than a thousand airstrips (largely agricultural) exist throughout
Costa Rica.

Efforts to pinpoint the exact origin of the Rodrlguez shipment

continued to delay the investigation.

The armaments carried Venezuelan

markings, however, and appeared to have been intended for the FSLN during
their revolution two years before.

The most likely loading spot seemed to

be Playa Tamarindo, on Guanacaste's Pacific coast.

To add to the confu-

sion, Rodrlguez cited Cuba as the chief source of arms trafficking.
Alberto Lorenzo, a former advisor to President Carazo's Ministry of Public
Security, soon seconded Rodrlguez's allegation.

72

At the beginning of July 1980, Lorenzo took the opportunity to
elaborate on his claim before the Special Commission.

Citing the involve-

ment of Panama's Omar Torrijos, U.S. President Carter, Fidel Castro, and
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President Carazo , Lorenzo asserted that during the Nicaraguan conflict,
armamen ts were flown from Cuba to Panama to Costa Rica before finally being
trucked to the FSLN forces in southern Nicaragua.

In Panama, Torrijos

supposedly skimmed off some arms that were later used as the basis for the
current arms trade.

According to Lorenzo, the same thing happened in

Costa Rica, where only half the weaponry of Cuban origin reached the Sandinistas.

Lorenzo further alleged that certain Sandinistas had arms "sent

back" to "local Costa Rican communists" at the time the weapons were arriving at Liberia's Llano Grande Airport.
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This disturbing assertion would

claim the attention o f the Speci al Commi s sio n again several months later.
Less than two weeks after Lorenzo's charges, the chiefs of the
Criminal Investigation Divi s ion (DIC), Colonels Guillermo Mart{ and Mario
Fallas, resigned.

They complained of a total lack of cooperation by the

Carazo government in their attempts to examine arms traffic allegations.
Twenty-five DIC detectives followed suit by resigning, which led to the
OIJ's assuming the responsibilities of the DIC.

In response, both Carazo

and his newly-appointed Security Minister, Carlos Arguedas le Franc,
insisted that they wanted the investigation to continue and that it had
their "full suport."

Carazo pointed out that a long history of gun-running

in Costa Rica existed and then cited the vast confiscation of arms carried
out in the previous two years.

In a similar vein, Arguedas r e marked that

the presence of twelve hundred private airstrips made it impossibl e t o
'
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contro 1 t h e arms tra ff lC.
But shortly afterwards, Fallas and Marti brushed aside such statements, following Lorenzo's previous claims with an assertion of their own
that arms had been flown directly from Cuba to Costa Rica during the
Nicaraguan Revolution.

Both men testified that they had directed the
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weapons deployment at Llano Grande Airport during the Revolution , taking
their order s from Willie Azofeifa, Chief of Staff of the Costa Ri can Public
Security Ministry, who was stationed at Llano Grande .

Azofeifa and an

FSLN leader, Costa Rican Elio Espinar, were in charge of d i viding the
weaponry between the Sandinista and Costa Rican stockpiles .

The Costa

Rican government hired EXACO cargo airlines, owned b y Chile an Fernando
Carrasco Illanes , to fly the weaponry from Cuba.

Costa Rican pilots flew

some thirty trips with EXACO's planes, bringing in approximately one million pounds of armaments, a quarter of which were intended for Costa Rican
arsen a ls.

The r e st were truck ed in Pub l i c Se curity vehicles to the FSLN

forces at the borde r.

Afterward, said MartI and Fallas , Esp inar and Civil

.
.
.
.
.
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Aviation Director Roberto de Benedlctls pald the Costa Rlc an pllo ts .
President Carazo immediately questioned the credibility of Fallas
and Martl.

On July 19, Public Security officials, directors of the Public

Force, and National Security agents responded with a communique acknowledging their participation in bringing arms into Costa Rica, but vehemently
denied receiving any illicit payments for that operation .

The fo l lowing

day, the President appeared on national television and radio to explain
Costa Rica's role in the Nicaraguan Revolution.

First of all, he admitted

that he had allowed the importation of "planes , rifl e s, ammunition, and
anti-aircraft guns, all defensive weapons , to protect Costa Rica"; second,
he insisted that this importation was altogether distinct from what he considered to be the object of the Special Commission's investigation: the
"sale, theft, and trafficking in arms for money ."

Cara z o c onclude d t h at

there was no r e ason, therefore, to investigate what he termed "the main.
tenance of securlty
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Costa Rlca.
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The events of subsequent weeks demonstrated how sensitive the whole
issue was, however, and how necessary was the continuing probe of Costa
Rica's importation of armament during the Nicaraguan crisis.

For instance,

contradictory statements abounded regarding the maintenance of inventories
of the incoming weaponry.

According to MartI, Azofeifa told him not to

keep track of the incoming war materials.

Then ex-Minister Echevarrla

(Azofeifa's boss at the time) asserted on the one hand that inventories
were kept at the two arms depositories, El Pelbn and Santa Rosa ranches,
and on the other hand, that it was impossible to determine how much
weaponry actually arrived in Costa Rica.

National police chief Colonel

Fernando Munoz, who had been in charge of incoming arms at the Santa Rosa
ranch, affirmed that no inventory was kept: but scarcely two months later,
Munoz produced a notebook containing a daily record of arms shipments to
the Santa Rosa ranch--the first and apparently the only such record.
Next to testify was EXACO's owner, Carrasco Illanes.
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He described

arranging seven flights, each containing twenty-two-thousand-pound shipments, and he named the pilots involved and the pay they received.
Throughout his account, he maintained that none of the flights came from
Cuba, and the pilots backed up his story.
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Carrasco also stated that his

planes were fueled by the government's oil company, RECOPE (Costa Rica
Oil Refinery), and that he had paid for the fuel.

He added that because

of the emergency situation, however, these flights were never required to
go through normal civil aviation procedures, and thus were never recorded.
Echevarr{a later explained that these actions were intended to keep Somoza
'
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The end of July brought the eagerly awaited Panamanian arms report
that was expected to explain Panama's involvement in the arms traffic.

It
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proved a disappointment to the Costa Rican Special Commission, however,
because it simply confirmed details of Rodr{guez's involvement and denied
any collusion with "Panamanian military or civilian authority."

The

Panamanian report essentially handed the entire arms trafficking problem
.
80
b ac k to Costa Rlca.

As the arms probe continued in Costa Rica, the government released
a report stating that three guerrilla training camps had been discovered
in the northern province of Alajuela.

Predictably, this announcement

brought a rebuke from La Nacion, whose editorial blamed the existence of
such camps on the government's leniency toward Sandinista operations within
Costa Rican territory during the Nicaraguan war.

The next day, the

Minister to the President reminded the media that the Costa Rican populace
had been overwhelmingly pro-Sandinista during the Revolution

and expressed

dismay at the media's current criticism of the government's involvement.
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On September 3, 1980, the Legislative Assembly passed a law
intended to strengthen the Special Commission by permitting punishment for
perjured testimony.

Although the bill was well-intentioned and needed

because of increasing contradictions in testimony, President Carazo vetoed
it five weeks later,
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a strange action for one asserting his "full sup-

port" of the efforts of the Special Commission.
Nonetheless, the commission's investigative endeavors continued,
despite the growing exasperation of its members.

In mid-September, the

commission's president complained that deception and outright fabrication
were inhibiting efforts to examine the issue.
took the stand.

In the meantime, Azofeifa

In his testimony, he denied any wrongdoing in the dis-

tribution of the imported arms, mentioned for the first time a Colombian
connection, and admitted that it was "possible" that some arms came from
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Cuba.

In addition, Azofeifa asserted that only the type of armament and

not the quantity was inventoried upon arrival.
Munoz's dramatic presentation of his notebook.

The last claim preceded
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Two weeks later, former Deputy Public Security Minister EchevarrIa
testified.

Adhering to the official government line that all arms had come

from Panama and Venezuela, he said that he could not remember any flights
with arms from Cuba.

But the second half of October saw a flurry of

activity and several more intriguing developments.

Azofeifa claimed that

earlier in 1980 he had received orders from former Minister EchevarrIa not
to show a portion of the government arsenal to deputies investigating the
possible "militarization" of the Public Security forces.

A retired pilot

then testified that sixty flights were made carrying arms and that some of
these had originated in Cuba.

The Public Security Ministry responded to

these declarations by placing a temporary, and obviously belated, freeze on
the import and sale of firearms.

Finally, Security Minister Arguedas

announced plans to destroy the "war booty" as well as other confiscated
armaments.

This last proposal, now recommended by the Special Commission

itself, brought questions and ridicule from the media.

A La Naci6n edi-

torial attacked it as "removal of the evidence," but the commission
·
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o ff ere d no exp 1 anatlon.
Former Public Security Minister Echevarria finally testified in
late October.

He began by criticizing the Special Commission's handling

of the arms probe in matters "better left alone," and then pointed out
that plenty of newsmen were at the border during the Sandinista Revolution,
and "they knew what was going on."

Echevarria then proceeded to explain

Costa Rica's role in the Nicaraguan conflict.

Confirming most of the

accusations that Somoza and his commanders had made during the war,
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EchevarrIa justified them as "indispensable to national security."

The

former minister also denied that any Costa Rican personnel had made flights
to Cuba.

On November 4, President Carazo reiterated that denial before the

Special Commission

and supported Echevarr{a's explanation.
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On November 27, a Costa - Rican- registered plane landed and crashed
forty miles southeast of San Salvador.

The two fliers in it were quickly

rescued by another plane and flown out of reach of pursuing authorities,
suggesting some kind of sophisticated coordination.

The Salvadorans found

the plane, owned by none other than EXACO, loaded with weapons.
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Th i s e v e nt normally would have been a h eadl ine s t o r y f o r Cost a
Rican newspapers, but it was eclipsed by a leaked accusation by one
Fernando Trejos Mas{s that President Carazo personally had been paid thirty
million dollars by the Sandinistas for aiding the Nicaraguan Revolution.
Trejos had made this claim during otherwise confusing secret testimony
before OIJ officials.

Carazo immediately went to the people with another

television and radio broadcast and filed a slander suit against Trejos as
well.

Such an accusation, however outrageous, in the midst of a worsening

economy and increased public questioning of Carazo and his administration,
could only further reduce Carazo's credibility.

The charges and counter-

charges continued throughout December and into the next year.
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By January 1981, the Special Commission was ready to conclude its
investigation.

Although many unanswered questions remained, the com-

mission had determined that Costa Rica had been used as an arms conduit
during the Nicaraguan war, contrary to the denials of public officials at
the time.

The investigators had also ascertained that control of imported

armaments was at best questionable.

In addition, the possibility existed
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that individuals or groups other than the Sandinistas and the Costa
Ric an government had received the incoming weaponry.

Finally, and most

intriguing of all, the commission had heard testimony of Cuban involvement
during the Nicaraguan crisis, but still had no proof of such claims.
"
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But on January 18, Honduran authorities captured a group of
leftists in the province of Comayagua.

Among them was Costa Rican Angel

Me ndez Castro, a school teacher from the province of Alajuela.

Honduran

officials promptly accused M~ndez of bringing arms from Costa Rica by way
of Nicaragua.

Al t hou g h h e a dmi tted makin g seve r al trips with cargo

obtained in the vicinity of the University of Costa Rica in San Jose ,
Me nde z claimed that he had been told that he was carrying medical supplies
and was simply a victim of circumstances.

The incident, however, seemed

to illustrate what might have happened to uninventoried and uncontrolled
weaponry that entered Costa Rica two years before.
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A more dramatic event occurred shortly after the Honduran guerrilla
capture.

On January 25, the Salvadoran Air Force shot down a plane

piloted by Costa Rican Julio Romero Talavera less than fifty miles southeast of San Salvador.

Romero had just finished parachuting two packages

containing thirty-three FAL rifles and nine thousand rounds of ammunition
"
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Back in Costa Rica, authorities busily

pieced together the preceding events; they were helped a few days later
when the imprisoned Romero willingly told what he knew of the incident.
Banned from the air for previous irregularities, the EXACO-owned plane was
authorized at the last minute by Civil Aviation Chief Roberto de Benedictis
to fly to Managua on a supposed "mercy mission" to bring EXACO owner
Fernando Carrasco back to a Costa Rican hospital for medical treatment.

32
After flying to Managua, however, the original pilot did not return, and
Romero wa s awakened the following night to fly the EXACO plane from Managua
to El Salvador.

In a prepared statement issued from his Salvadoran cell,

Romero alleged that Carrasco had offered to pay him to fly supplies to the
Salvadoran rebels, but Romero claimed he did not accept payment for this
flight.

Furthermore, he described how simple it had been to leave Managua,

saying that he encountered no security precautions at all.

His otherwise

revealing account did not say when or where the weapons were loaded.
The reaction in Costa Rica was immediate and predictable.
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The

media denounced governme nt " inacti o n " and "in d i f f erence" and alluded to the
"app arent complicity of national authorities."

Carazo ordered the ground-

ing of all planes registered by Carrasco, and immigration authorities
cancelled his residency visa days later.
resigned.

In addition, de Benedictis

Meanwhile, residents of Guanacaste told reporters that flights

had been leaving sporadically from Liberia since the previous April.
of this proved that the arms traffic investigation was far from over.
Meanwhile, President Carazo was beset by problems.

All
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On February 12,

Public Security Minister Arguedas, Police Chief Munoz, and the Civil
Registry Director all resigned; Willie Azofeifa, now Chief Clerk, was given
a "temporary separation."

Then President Carazo's choice of a new Public

Security Minister precipitated the resignation of that department's deputy
minister.

With the exception of Azofeifa, all those resigning cited

"personal reasons" and the desire to "pursue private interests."

A Radio

Reloj commentary termed the shake-up a "crisis" and quoted rumors of a
scandal involving the issuance of visas to Cuban refugees.

Although these

rumors were confirmed less than two weeks later, no resigning official was
lmp 1 lcate d . 93
o

0
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In late February, the

u.s.

Department of State issued its contro-

versial "White Paper," which documented the flow of arms from Cuba to EI
Salvador.

Costa Rica received only a passing reference in a report

designed to implicate Cuban and Soviet-bloc involvement.

In that refer-

ence, the White Paper spoke only of "overland operations," never mentioning
the periodic clandestine plane flights that by now were acknowledged
throughout Central America and had been witnessed by many Costa Ricans.
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Three weeks later, the firebombing in San Jose of a U.S. embassy
van containing three U. S. marines and their Costa Rican chauffeur stunned
Costa Rica .
Embassy.

Less than an h o u r lat er, a bomb exploded inside the Honduran

That same day, while national and international l e aders condemned

the bombings, a previously unknown leftist guerrilla group , Comando Carlos
..
'
'
d responsl' b 1'I'lty . 95
Arguero
Ec h evarrla,
c I alme

More attacks followe d in the

ensuing months before OIJ officials were able to round up the terrorists ,
and although many turned out to be foreigners, a substantial number of
Costa Ricans were among those captured .
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A week after the initial bombings, as the Special Commission was
again ready to issue its arms traffic report , Llano Grande ' s former airport administrator and four pilots electrified the nation with a damning
confession .

Convinced that the recent bombings signalled the development

of terrorist movements in Costa Rica that were a dir e ct result of uncontrolled importation of arms during the Nicaraguan crisis, the five decided
to break their silence and admit to perjuring themselves months before
when questioned about arms importation.

Now they confirmed Cuban par-

ticipation in the Nicaraguan Revolution that had employed Costa Rica as an
arms conduit.

What had been hidden previously under the guise o f "national

security" now became public knowledge for the same reason.
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Although ex-Minister Echevarr{a immediately denied the pilot s '
confe s sion , President Carazo went before the nation, admitted authorizing
the shipments of arms from Cuba, and assumed full responsibility.

He

emphasized, however, that they were weapons bought by the Panamanian
government, and therefore Panamanian property, even though they had been
'
f rom Havana. 98
fl own ln
Carazo's speech prompted a call for his resignation by several
national political figures.

/

However, LU1S Alberto Monge, once again the

PLN's president ial candidate, expressed the view that such a resignation
would set off a cons t i t utio nal crisis and further damage the country.
Carazo vowed not to resign, reiterating the need to distinguish between
arms trafficking for profit and arms imported for defending the nation's
sovereignty.

With President Carazo's admission, Echevarria also admitted

allowing the shipments, but insisted that because of the immediacy of
Somoza's threats and the inability of Costa Rica to buy arms, "we had to
get them where we could."

Assuring the media that no government agreement

was made with Cuban authorities, Echevarria then refused to reveal any more
details of the arms import, terming such information a "state secret."
While the newly vindicated Colonels Marti and Fallas looked on, Manuel
Antonio Guerra and Roberto de Benedictis also confirmed their part in the
,

Cub an connectlon.
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De Benedictis even admitted suggesting, on the ddvice

of Azofeifa, that the five pilots keep their mouths shut.

Inevitably,

rumors circulated that Carazo had made a trip to Havana to meet with
Castro.

By this time, Costa Ricans were prepared to believe any thing

' presl'd ent . 100
ab out t h elr
Meanwhile, the five pilots outlined their trips.

They testified

to making a total of twenty-one flights representing well over six hundred
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thousand pounds of arms and munitions.

They indicated that the "air

bridge" from Panama began late in 1978 and said that Panamanian pilots
transported the rest of the weaponry.

They also insisted that two flights

came in from Portugal and West Germany, but later investigation did not
confirm this statement.

The pilots further told of carrying Cuban person-

nel, and of seeing Raul Castro on several occasions and even Fidel on
another.

These allegations brought calls by two national newspapers for a

break in ties with Cuba, relations that had been strained since their
re-establishment in 1977.

Citing the country's economic straits as well,

La Naci6n condemned the Carazo administration for its actions in leading
Costa Rica into "a morass of incredulity, mistrust, and frustration."

Days

later President Carazo's cabinet approved a recommendation to resubmit the
Special Commission's perjury bill.

On April 14, television, radio/ and news

personnel met with commission investigators and urged them to continue
their probe.
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Soon afterward the government announced its intention to return
borrowed weapons to Panama.

This plan immediately set off yet anothe r

controversy, as the media and legislators alike pointed out the difficulty
of returning something supposedly not even inventoried.

Moreover, as Radio

Reloj reminded the country, the arms were presumably returned at the end of
the Nicaraguan conflict, and all ensuing government-published inventories
had not indicated any leftover weaponry from Panama.
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The government

'
103
,
re 1 ease d a I 1st
of arms, b ut f a1'I e d to clar1' fy t h e 1ssue.

The conse-

quence of all this confusion was that Panamanian pilots made twenty-five
flights the following week, taking approximately one hundred twenty-five
thousand pounds of weapons and munitions back to Panama.
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But during the Panamanian arms controversy, one final witness
testified t o the Special Commission before it issued its report.

On

April 21, ex-Sandinista commander Alejandro Cesar Mart{ nez jolted the
investigators with his statement that between four and six hundred FAL
rifles were sent to a local group of "leftist extremists" in the province
of Alajue la.

Mart{nez named two Nicaraguan directorate members as the ones

responsible for sending the weaponry.

Although Eden Pastora quickly sent a

note to the investigators denying Martinez's charges, La Rep~blica
denounced the shipment and recalled earlier testimony by one of the four
men indicted in the mortar- s h e l l smug g ling case.

Almost a year before, the

alleged smuggler had claimed that arms imported into Llano Grande Airport
were sent to Alajuela--the opposite direction from which arms would go if
. .
105
.
meant f or Costa Rlcan
stock pl. I es or t h e San d lnlstas.

Mart{nez's claims thus returned the investigation to its starting
point of July 1980.

His testimony apparently confirmed initial allegations

by Alberto Lorenzo that some arms intended for the Sandinistas had been
diverted to clandestine Costa Rican groups.

Furthermore, such testimony

underscored the importance of the arms probe.

Conclusions
On May 14, 1981, the long-awaited arms - traffic report was delivered
to key government officials and various media sources.

It represented the

distillation of three thousand pages of testimony given by seventy people.
The document included a summary of the arms investigation, with detailed
accounts of the Rodr{guez, Romero, and Me ndez cases; a discussion of arms
imports and airport procedures; several arms and munitions inventories; and

·
·
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But the seventy-three-page report left many questions unanswered.
Chief among them was the question of exactly how much weaponry actually
came into Costa Rica during the Nicaraguan Revolution.

The best estimate

was one million pounds, of which a quarter to a half was intended for Costa
Rican arsenals.

Sources disagreed as to whether the Costa-Rica-bound

weaponry was inventoried or not.

The Special Commission's report condemned

the poor regulation of arsenals as well as the lack of controls of the
incoming armament.

It offered pages of suggestions to improve the archaic

arms-storage system and also published the government's latest inventories,
including a l i st o f arms officially borro wed f r om P anama.
Munoz's much publicized notebook
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But Fernan do

that supposedly contained a daily record

of arms admitted to the Santa Rosa ranch

received no attention whatsoever.

Furthermore, the report did not clear up certain confusions surrounding the imported Panamanian armament.

For instance, if one hundred

twenty-five thousand pounds returned to Panama constituted all or most of
what was specifically lent to Costa Rica,108 the amount fell far short of
the previous

estimat~

between a quarter and a half million pounds.

If,

however, it was simply the balance of previously returned weaponry, then
further examination was necessary to ascertain why such a balance was
retained, and also why the government implied that the balance had been
kept for Special Commission inspection when that committee did not exist
until a year later.

It is also noteworthy that although a leftist group or

groups carried out terrorist attacks in Costa Rica during the spring of
1981, none of the weaponry found in their possession (with the exception of
the FAL rifles) fit the descriptions of the weaponry brought in by Costa
,
"1
Rlcan
and Panamanlan
PlotS. 109

Nonetheless, the original lack of controls
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constituted a justifiable and important concern for Costa Rica's officials
and it s peop le .
In addition to these questions raised by the report, there were
other significant implications that the report raised.
lowed the events closely were not shocked by the report.

Those who had folSimilarly, those

who had relied on headlines and gossip were not surprised by the investigators' call for a "moral sanction" against President Carazo and ex-Public
Security Minister EchevarrIa.

President Carazo was denounced nationwide,

but not for his arms traffic for profit--the investigators readily admitted
they had no p r oof of that- -nor f or his dec i s i on to import arms.

Instead,

the commission censured Carazo and Echevarria for going "be yond the limits
of their legal functions," and for "obstructing the exercise of the
investigative powers that the Constitution grants to the Le gislative
Assembly."

Thus, the report did not deny the threat t hat had faced Costa

Rica during the Nicaraguan Revolution.

The investigators could understand

that Carazo felt justified in bending the law that forbids the import of
arms, either loaned or bought, without prior Legislative Assembly approval.
But the commission insisted that once that crisis was over, the president
should have reported to the legislative body the emergency steps he had
.
110
taken to protect Costa Rlca.

Governmental policy during the Nicaraguan conflict was undo ubtedly
affected by popular sentiment.

For more than forty years, the Costa Rican

people had lived next to a society and political system quite different
from their own.
Somoza regime.

During the Nicaraguan

wa~

they were clearly against the

Their opposition solidified with the death of two of

their country's Civil Guards in November 1978 and of the fourteen-y e arold girl scarcely two months later.

39

Thus, when the FSLN forces began openly to use Costa Rican terri tory, a conspiracy of silence resulted .

The media led the conspiracy ,

c hoo sing to look the other way rather than publicly report their gove rnment's involvement. 111

When the international media hinted at Costa Rican

participation in March 1979 and spoke with assurance of that assistance in
June, the Costa Rican media echoed the denials of its people and its
government.
Furthermore, the much publicized clean-up operations seemed to
bear out government claims of both neutrality and control of their border .
Nor could the OAS s u rvei l lance teams prove the collusion of Costa Rica and
Panama wi th the Sandinistas.

Although members of the opposition PLN occa-

s ionally questioned or denounced the policies of Pre sident Carazo and
Minister Echevarrfa, the public did not join in those criticisms.

When

the war ended, the denials continued and Costa Ricans generously aided
Nicaragua in its rebuilding efforts.
Then two things happened.

First, the Sandinista government

asserted its Marxist ideology more strongly, at the same time affiliating
itself more closely with Cuba.

Second, the arms probe began.

What had

started as a straightforward investigation of arms commerce soon exposed
hidden government policy during and after the Nicaraguan Revolution.
official denials of Costa Rican involvement quickly faded.

The

The Costa Rican

people learned that the arms that came through their country were shipped
directly from Cuba.

They felt betrayed by the FSLN and by their govern-

ment because they had not been told the full extent of their government's
role in the war.
able.

How they would have reacted, had they known, is debat-

President Carazo doubtless sensed the Costa Ricans' ambival e n c e

toward the Sandinistas' Marxist leanings.

Public disclosure that arms were
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being flown in from Cuba would have been political suicide and, quite
possibly, a threat to the country's peace.

A wiser alternative seemed to

be to keep the Cuban source of military aid a secret.
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However, the cover-up and Carazo's belated explanations may have
been far more damaging to his reputation and the country's international
prestige than speedy acknowledgement of the arms flights at the war's end.
Public admission of the Cuban connection certainly would not have posed a
threat to Costa Rica's national security a full year after the end of the
Nicaraguan Revolution, but official denials hurt Costa Rica's credibility
,
, , ' ,
113
and made Presldent Carazo's veto of the perJury blll a SUSPlClOUS move.
The opposition PLN could not have asked for a better political
issue.

Yet curiously, they have not exploited the controversy nearly as

muc h as might be expected, nor has it been a major political issue in the
ensuing election.

This situation may be due to several factors.

the economy has understandably been the country's chief concern.

First,
Second,

the arms traffic scandal, Cuba's role in it, and the attempted cover-up by
President Carazo and his former Minister Echevarrla speak rather eloquently
for themselves of the administration's poor judgment.

Most obviously,

Carazo is constitutionally prohibited from running again for president and
,
' h 'lS party , s c an d'd
from publlcly
supportlng
late. 114

Thus, Carazo and his

administration have not been central to this year's campaign.

Nonetheless,

given the tendencies of political parties, it seems likely that had there
been no economic crisis, the arms controversy would have been fully
exploited by the PLN.
The issue did affect Costa Rica's relations with Cuba.

During the

second week of May 1981, the Carazo administration suspended its consular
ties with the Cuban government.

Although Cuban involvement in the arms

41
traffic and the suspicions of the Carazo administration about local terrorists undoubtedly colored the decision, the break was officially attributed
to an offensive Cuban note "attacking" Costa Rica.

11S

Cuban diplomats had

apparently circulated this note at the United Nations more than four months
before, but it had only recently come to the attention of the Costa Rican
government .

The note thus provided a quick and politically painless way

for the Carazo administration to defuse growing internal pressure for such
a break .
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A final political issue was the conduct of Don Pepe Figueres, one
of the architects of modern Costa Rica.

Figueres' donation of arms to Eden

Pastora recalls the dreams of the former Caribbean Legion.

Although the

group had long since disbanded, Figueres had the satisfaction of helping
conclude an endeavor first attempted more than thirty years before.
.

.

Ironlcally, he alde

d

.

..

a movement he knew held strong Marxlst convlctlons.
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But his animosity toward the Somoza family, aggravated on numerous occasions during the preceding three decades, proved a stronger argument in
favor of assisting the FSLN.
In addition, Don Pepe's actions (not to mention those of the Carazo
administration) demonstrated the relative ease with which Costa Rica could
be used as a channel for weapons movement.

Those actions harked back to

times when internal civil wars spilled over to neighboring countries and
foreign intervention was commonplace .

The exploits of the buccaneers of

Spanish colonial times, the filibusters of the mid-nineteenth century, and
finally, the efforts of groups like the Caribbean Legion all underscored the
traditional fluidity of Central America's regional borders.

While those

borders have been more jealously guarded in recent years, arms trafficking

42

has still bee n a way of life in Central America, including Costa Rica,
for at lea st the past thirty years.
Costa Rica's intermittent involvement has been traced from its
origins in Costa Rica's short 1948 Revolution to the present-day arms
scandal.

Costa Rica's tolerance of political exile groups and their

trafficking in arms (encouraged by Jos~ Figueres during the years following
the 1948 Revolution) has allowed the nation to be used as a staging area
for the invasion of other countries.

During the Nicaraguan war, the Carazo

administration took advantage of not only that attitude, but also of the
inherent diffic ulty i n moni toring gue rri lla border activities, and thus
aided the Sandinista victory over Somoza.
But the subsequent arms probe, with its revelations and reactions
from public authorities as high as the President, were damaging both to
Costa Rica's leaders and to the self-esteem of its people.

At the time of

the disclosures, Carazo claimed it was necessary to distinguish the issue
of arms trade for money from that of borrowing arms for the defense of the
country's sovereignty.

That distinction, however, and the definition of

what constitutes the legitimate defense of one's country, were precisely
at the crux of the problem.

To further complicate the situation, there

were inconsistencies in government foreign policy during the Nicaraguan
crisis as well as deception by public officials onc e the war was over.
Finally came the question of violation of the Costa Rican constitution.
Many of these issues still need to be dealt with.

By the end of 1981, not

one person implicated in the arms scandal had yet been indicted.
As the Special Commission reached the close of its investigative
efforts, however, Costa Ricans were more hopeful for their country's
future.

In the first place, the commission deserved praise for both its
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persistence and the relative openness with which it carried out its probe.
Secondly, the Judicial Investigation Organization had demonstrated its
effectiveness in gathering evidence related to the political scandal
involving the Carazo administration and in capturing many of the extremists
who have recently plagued Costa Rica.

In addition, Costa Rica's democratic

process appears to have weathered the political storms of the past three
years surprisingly well.

Finally, with the 1982 elections, the National

Liberation Party will almost certainly win control of the Costa Rican
government, bringing in a new administration headed by Lu{s Alberto
Monge.
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But whether these factors will be equal to the task of restoring

Costa Rica's internal and international credibility remains to be seen.
The present financial crisis has brought Costa Rica's economy to a virtual
standstill.

Violence in nearby EI Salvador and Guatemala, and an increas-

ingly militarized Nicaragua next door, undoubtedly will further affect the
nation's political future.

All in all, Costa Rica will be harder pressed

than ever to maintain its traditional stability.
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SSDS
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the opportunity, he would have imported arms from Libya! LR, 2 June 1981,
p. 4.
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115
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118Costa Ricans seem ready for a change in national leadership; a
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